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ABSTRACT: Memes, defined in terms of ideas, mental representations or information, are 
used in an attempt to explain the spread of cultural practices. We argue that such reference 
to hidden replicators, which are said to have causal effects on a person’s actions, appears to 
explain human behavioral patterns, but only results in restating the observed behavior. This 
approach, based on a memotype–phemotype distinction, falls prey to the unsolvable 
problems of mind–body dualism.  
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Some attempts to define memes in concrete terms have regarded neurological 
synapse activation patterns as the units of transmission. Due to the lack of 
structural similarities, neuronal patterns in different people can only be said to 
correspond to one meme when they are correlated with behavior that is grouped as 
equivalent. Regarding memes as merely theoretical entities would potentially result 
in a sound scientific theory, but only if it allowed for better predictions than 
analyzing behavior alone.  
The direct relation between behavior and environment, from which the meme 
is derived, serves equally well as a source for prediction. Consequently, a more 
coherent evolutionary explanation for the spread of cultural practices regards 
behavioral units, instead of unobservable entities underlying them, as the units of 
selection. Behavior can be understood as directly selected by its consequences. 
In 1976, Richard Dawkins proposed the possibility of a naturally selected 
replicator of cultural transmission, which he called the meme, analogous to the 
gene in biological evolution. Even if not intended by Dawkins, memetics became a 
popular theory, purporting to offer causal accounts for the spread of cultural 
practices by reference to hidden replicators.  
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Ever since its introduction, the concept of meme has always had scores of 
detractors who criticized it from a variety of perspectives, such as that units of 
culture are not discrete, do not replicate faithfully (Boyd & Richerson, 2005), or 
lack empirical support (Gatherer, 1998). It turns out that many of the criticisms can 
be attributed to problems resulting from tautological reference to hidden entities. 
These problems will be spelled out in the course of this paper. Dawkins’s memes 
were posited as replicators in cultural evolution, analogous to genes in biological 
evolution. Ever since the proposal of the concept in 1976, authors have disagreed 
about the nature of memes as “units of selection.” The definitions of most authors 
can be grouped into the following categories: (a) memes as abstractions such as 
mental representations, information, or ideas; (b) memes as neurological patterns; 
or (c) memes as behavioral units.  
In this paper we provide reasons for rejecting the first two definitions and 
argue for explanation of cultural evolution in terms of the replication of behavioral 
units.  
 Memes as Mental Representations, Information, or Ideas 
Dualism and Realism 
Congruent with the common definition of culture as information stored in 
human brains (Boyd & Richerson, 2000; Henrich et. al., 2008), the replicators of 
cultural evolution are most often defined in terms of information (e.g., Dawkins, 
1982b; Dennett, 1996a). Other popular definitions view memes as the essence of 
something, ideas, mental states such as representations, socio-cultural information, 
beliefs, concepts, semantic structures, values, theories, convictions and so forth 
(e.g., Blackmore, 1999; Dawkins, 1982b; Gabora, 1997; Pulliam, 1983; Ridley, 
1997; and Wilkins, 1998). However, definitions of memes in such terms are 
problematic when aiming at a scientific account of cultural practices. The core of 
the problem originates in their implication of a dualistic worldview, holding that 
two fundamental types of substances—mental and material—exist, each in a 
separate sphere (Descartes, 1641/1992). In a dualistic worldview, the body is 
considered to have an extension in the physical world, whereas the mind or soul, 
which produces feelings and thoughts, resides in a realm separate from that 
physical world. This substance dualism gives rise to the mind–body problem, 
which also arises when memes are taken as real: The memes, consisting of 
information, mental representations, and ideas are said to cause our behavior. They 
are regarded as separate from behavior, as parts of a separate mental world.  
To be sure, most authors may claim that they are not dualists. Instead, some 
might declare they adhere to a functionalist’s or identity theorist’s point of view, 
but as will become apparent in the course of this paper, often any ordinary English 
speaker would conclude from their choice of words that they view memes as 
hidden entities residing in a mental world but affecting an individual’s behavior in 
a separate, material world. 
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Not merely in folk psychology is the dualist’s view tightly interwoven with a 
realist’s stance. Because vague verbal theory terms like ideas and mental 
representations do not fulfill a practical function (i.e., they do not allow for 
effective action such as control and prediction), it seems implausible to assume 
that they are merely introduced as labels for functions that serve to describe 
relations between events. Then, if not reasoning in this ontologically agnostic 
paradigm of pragmatism, for what purpose is the term meme introduced? Is this 
reasoning part of a belief in an object-like existence of a causally effective entity in 
some kind of real world? Such explanations are likely to presume dualism.  
A realist, truly non-dualistic interpretation of information, ideas, and mental 
representations is possible, however, and does not result in the problems that we 
will spell out here. For example, none of the problems of dualism occur if mental 
representations are realistically interpreted as terms referring to (i.e., occasioned 
by) behavioral regularities. Saying, for example, that our beliefs are named 
patterns of behavior means adopting a non-dualist realist stance because it amounts 
to repudiating inner states (as dualistic realists define beliefs). For example, to 
believe that incest is wrong is to avoid incest, to speak against it, and to punish it 
when it occurs. In such a view, the behavioral patterns we name are real. Beliefs, 
when non-dualistically defined as patterns of (verbal and nonverbal) behavior, can 
be used to predict behavior and, thus, are valuable to scientific theories. It seems 
inadvisable, however, to use the same term as those meme proponents whose 
arguments cause confusion with their official non-dualistic stance expressed in 
wording highly reminiscent of dualistic views.  
Hence, the problems detailed below do not originate from a realist 
interpretation of mental terms but rather from an inclination to implicitly rely on a 
distinction between a mental (or imagined neural world) and a real world when 
arguing in mental terms. For instance, Dennett (1991), an otherwise outstanding 
opponent of dualist argumentation (e.g., 1996b), writes that a “mind is. . .created 
when memes restructure a human brain” (p. 207). From a non-dualist’s stance, 
what does it mean for a meme to restructure a brain? If all Dennett aims to say is 
that the individual’s behavior goes along with changes in the brain, it is unclear 
what the introduction of the term meme contributes to that explication. 
Blackmore’s (1999) and Dawkins’s (1982b) way to put their argument that memes 
can cause behavior also points to a (most likely unintended) implication of 
dualistic thinking. Given that Blackmore (1997) objects to a dualistic worldview 
and identifies mental states with brain states, how should we understand the 
following statement?: “our brains and minds have been the product of two 
replicators. . .but as memetic evolution proceeds faster and faster, our minds are 
increasingly the product of memes, not genes” (p. 44). In the following paragraphs 
we explain what is troublesome about a scientific account of cultural practices that 
does not relinquish intuitively appealing dualistic explanations.  
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Problems with Mentalistic Meme Definitions 
Inhibition of scientific inquiry. B. F. Skinner adopted the term mentalism to 
talk about the kind of dualism that separates mental from behavioral events. 
Although Dawkins originally (1976) did not use the term meme to explain the 
occurrence of practices, the underlying assumption of dualism became apparent 
later when he argued—without specifying mechanisms or environmental events—
that memes can cause facial or hand gestures, words, and so on, in individuals 
(Dawkins, 1982b). 
The major trouble with mentalistic accounts is that they lead to pseudo-
explanations. Superficially, the occurrence of behavior appears to have been 
elucidated because we can name an entity that seems to have caused the behavior. 
The “explanation,” however, is only apparent because the entity (e.g., belief) is 
inferred to exist from the behavior it is supposed to explain; the “explanation” is 
circular. Suppose Ted is seen to sing “Yellow submarine.” He is said to have a song 
meme, and then to sing the song because of the song meme. An acceptable 
explanation would point to a combination of preceding events like hearing the 
song while Lisa sings it and receiving appreciation for singing other songs, rather 
than to an inner entity. To be sure, in many sciences, especially in physics, the first 
proposal of an entity is often inferred from the phenomena it is supposed to explain. 
However, further evidence for the effect of the entity needs to be collected, and a 
phenomenon at hand cannot be explained by the supposed momentary effect of an 
unobserved entity whose existence lacks any confirmation apart from the 
phenomenon to be explained.  
Because it appears to explain, such a mentalistic semblance of an explanation 
obstructs further scientific inquiry. Claiming that memes, as ideas, make us behave 
is an example of mentalism. Neither borrowing a term like idea from folk 
psychology nor inventing a term like meme provides an explanation. The inclusion 
of either term results neither in a proximate explanation shedding light on the 
mechanisms at work nor in an ultimate, historical account (see next section).  
The claim that a meme is involved in the mechanisms underlying our 
behavior makes us wonder what this meme consists of. Where is it stored? How is 
it retrieved? How does the idea of wearing a skirt make me wear a skirt? How an 
idea is supposed to cause behavior is a complicated, if not unanswerable, question. 
It keeps us from studying what could actually result in an explanation: the 
replication and selection of behavior. Instead, mentalistic concepts (like memes, if 
memes are equated with ideas) support theories containing other mentalistic 
notions such as the mind. The expansion of mentalistic vocabulary by neologisms 
like meme supports the development of misleading mentalistic theories.  
Redundancy. Using the presence of a meme as an explanation of a practice is 
objectionable because the (mental) meme is superfluous in the sense that it restates 
the behavior. Everything that is needed to explain the occurrence of the meme—the 
outline of past context and consequences—is sufficient to explain the behavior 
directly.  
EXPELLING THE MEME-GHOST FROM THE MACHINE: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
EXPLANATION FOR THE SPREAD OF CULTURAL PRACTICES 
131 
In the memetic stance, for example, as proposed by Blackmore (e.g., 1999) 
and Dennett (e.g., 1996a), something additional is invented, something that is said 
to have replicated an idea or representation. Taking this point of view, two 
phenomena—the representation as well as what is said to be its consequence, the 
singing—need to be explained. The theory also fails to explain why singing is 
selective. Ted does not start singing all songs that are sung in his presence. 
One might argue that an analysis of an activity’s past context and 
consequences is not sufficient, and that we have to discuss brain activity in order to 
fully explain the occurrence of practices. Yes, a complete explanation is one giving 
the proximate as well as the ultimate reasons leading to behavior. An explanation 
including only the immediately responsible mechanisms in the body—the 
proximate causes—or one only giving the historical, ultimate, origins of behavior, 
would each be incomplete in its own way. If neurologists and physiologists 
explained all mechanisms of the nervous system (involving, for instance, accounts 
of certain synaptic activations) producing behavior, we still would not know why 
this activation takes place. Mechanisms are a cause of behavior in the sense that 
the activity of an individual changes or stops when the mechanisms’ processes are 
interrupted. However, why does certain activity in the nervous system lead to 
behavior at one moment but not at another? Even if we were able to predict the 
behavior of an organism by measuring the activity in certain parts of its nervous 
system, we cannot claim to have understood its behavior because we neither know 
what it originates from nor what function it fulfills for the organism. Thus, 
reduction to mechanisms is not the only mode of explanation needed in science. If 
that were the case, mechanics would have to wait for discoveries in atomic physics 
to advance and evolutionary accounts of species would be replaced by a better 
understanding of the workings of DNA (Baum & Heath, 1992).  
A science of behavior is possible, just as a science of physiological 
mechanisms in bodies is possible. A science of behavior gives ultimate (historical) 
explanations dealing with both the individual’s phylogeny and ontogeny. In this 
way, it answers the question why certain behavior is momentarily exhibited by 
discovering what induces it, what function it fulfills, and why it might have 
developed in evolutionary history. Optimally, we would be able to give an account 
of behavior relying on both ultimate and proximate explanations.  
A science of behavior aiming at explaining behavior without debating 
neuronal activity is possible in the same way that physiology did not have to wait 
for biochemical accounts to explain cell functions. Similarly, proximate 
neurological explanations are an addition to, not a substitute for, the ultimate 
explanation of behavior by present and past events in the environment. As Skinner 
(1974) pointed out, only from the science of behavior can neuroscientists know 
which phenomena need to be explained. The mode of explanation behavior 
analysis offers resembles the one offered by Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
(Darwin, 1859/2007). Adding a vague, purely verbal notion of mental 
representations to our explanations of behavior occasioned by environmental 
contingencies (or even replacing the latter by the former) does more harm than 
good. Giving historical explanations avoids unscientific concepts such as hidden 
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agents (e.g., Creator, Intelligence, or Will). Our interpretation of “memes” as 
behavioral patterns (which is explicated in the section Practices—The Units of 
Selection in Cultural Evolution) is an example of such an historical account, based 
on an organism’s phylogeny as well as ontogeny.  
The problem of agency. To claim that a meme, as an entity inside us that 
steers our behavior, acts selfishly and purposively is to relocate and aggravate the 
problems of mentalism. One would still need to explain how the meme can 
influence our actions, why it does so in particular ways, what it consists of, and so 
forth. To assert that our actions—and “we,” Blackmore (1999) writes—are the 
products of memes means to reinvent a type of Creationism in which the purposive 
supernatural being with creational powers is located inside the organism.  
To Jahoda (2002), Blackmore “appears to deny the reality of individual 
contributions [when she writes] ‘I would say that the book was a combined product 
of genes and memes playing out their competition in [the author’s] life’ 
(Blackmore, 1999: 239)’” (p. 66). Disagreeing with the notion of intentionality in 
memes, Jahoda seeks to explain people’s actions by referring to their ability to act 
purposively. Apparently he overlooks the more general drawbacks of explanations 
including intentionality—no matter if applied to the individual or a meme. The 
complex and novel behavior of writing a book can be explained by shedding light 
on several converging histories of reinforcement in the author’s ontogeny and 
events in the species’ phylogeny. Such historical explanation would seem complex 
compared to an intentional one. When asked to explain scientifically where the 
intention to write a book came from in the first place, however, one would have to 
refer to the very same history.  
Blackmore (1999) even suggests possible histories of reinforcement that can 
lead to writing a book, but she denies that the author herself—that is, as a whole 
individual—is influenced by them. Instead, she claims that the author’s past led to 
a combination of memes in the author’s brain, which made her write the book. At 
first, she explicitly rejects the dualistic notion of an agent inside us: “There is no 
one inside there to do the doing” (p. 240), but then she adds “other than a bunch of 
memes” (p. 240). She is right to disclaim “a magical, out-of-nowhere power such 
as consciousness” (p. 240) but mistakenly maintains the necessity of a “generative 
power” (p. 240). Instead of questioning that need, she tries to satisfy it by replacing 
an unspecified agent (consciousness) with the notion of meme. Memes, however, 
are as blurry a concept as any other agent inside us. To shift intentionality from the 
individual to a meme (even when thought to be natural) means to replace one 
imaginary agent by another in the hope of naming an immediate cause. Not the 
behavior of parts of or things inside individuals, but only historical accounts can 
offer a coherent explanation of behavior excluding imaginary agents. 
Dennett (1991) writes that “memes restructure [emphasis added] a human 
brain in order to [emphasis added] make it a better habitat” (p. 365), which means 
that they act in certain ways because they want to achieve a goal. Talking about 
people, Dennett (1997) advocated “taking the intentional stance” to explain and 
predict their behavior, which means, for example, to attribute beliefs and intentions 
to individuals. Dennett (1997) regards his intentional stance to be useful to make 
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predictions and argues that intentional idioms are justifiable because they are 
provisional and can be “cashed out” in principle. This might be correct in theory; 
however, mentalistic accounts of an organism’s behavior are most frequently not 
cashed out in practice because people rarely see the need to do so. They perceive 
the explanation containing intentional idioms to be complete. Therefore, scientists 
who try to be precise avoid them due to their tendency to lead to confusion (Baum 
& Heath, 1992).  
Talk of selfishness or intentionality in regard to memes might be even more 
misleading than in regard to humans. It is common to talk about intentionality in 
people. It serves as a shortcut in everyday speech and holds the possibility of being 
interpreted in a non-dualist way by identifying it with behavior from which a 
dualist would derive it. A non-dualist interpretation excludes calling intention the 
cause of an action. Even if rarely done, the possibility of a non-dualist 
interpretation exists when talking about people’s intentions. Thus, the notion of 
intentionality in humans runs the risk of not being “cashed out.” Intentionality in 
memes, however, does not even hold the option of being identified with or 
translated into behavioral terms. If we cannot observe a meme, we cannot derive 
intentions or selfishness from its behavior. Therefore, back translation or “cashing 
out” is impossible. 
In sum, Dawkins (1976) makes clear what the selfishness of genes translates 
to. Attributing intentions to memes, however, does not work analogously because 
selfishness cannot be cashed out by translating it into the behavior of an entity 
when we do not even know what the entity is. Moreover, it is impossible to derive 
predictions by abstracting behavior of an unobservable entity to patterns, which is 
one of Dennett’s motivations to “take the intentional stance.” The problem with 
intentionality is that, if not cashed out, it implies hidden agents whose behavior 
also needs to be explained. Since folk psychology and our language build upon 
abstract concepts like intentionality, we are accustomed to applying them when 
deriving predictions that can then be reformulated in observable terms. Those 
abstractions can, however, in no way explain the occurrence of behavior. 
Homunculi. If memes made us behave, the big question would be: What 
determines their behavior? Do memes have memes inside them that determine how 
they have to control an individual’s behavior? If so, should we expect memes 
inside memes inside memes inside memes. . .? Have we started an infinite regress? 
Or else, if memes are used to explain our actions by stating that they control our 
behavior, do we have to grant that they are guided by their own free will? That 
people, memes, or homunculi act by free will can never be confirmed because in 
order to empirically prove free will one would have to observe an act go counter to 
prediction when all possible contributing factors were firmly known, which is 
impossible. Furthermore, the connection between the non-natural force of free will 
and the natural event of action will always remain a mystery and therefore is not 
subject to science. These problems arise when behavior is assigned to parts, 
especially hidden parts, of or inside organisms instead of to whole organisms 
(Baum, 2005; Bennett & Hacker, 2007).  
SIMON & BAUM 
134 
Natural selection on unnatural forces. Another unanswerable question is 
where non-natural forces—those that are not localizable in time and space, such as 
memes and free will—originate. How can natural mechanisms select a non-natural 
entity? Moreover, as Darwin (1859/2007) puts it: “natura non facit saltus” (p. 
416)—nature does not make jumps. If jumps occur, like those evident in 
mutations, they are usually small. A sudden appearance of memes and free 
will in certain advanced animals or humans raises the problem of discontinuity of 
species and is therefore difficult to reconcile with evolutionary theory.  
Blackmore (1997) writes that “without memetics you cannot answer questions 
like. . .‘Why did I decide to write this article and not that one?. . .’ Without 
memetics you can only fall back on appeals to an imaginary conscious agent” (p. 
43). The trouble is, however, that when writing that unobservable memes make us 
behave, memeticists do not clarify what distinguishes memes from imaginary 
agents. At present, no method exists to observe internal memes, and the invention 
of methods to observe them is doubtful. 
Memes in causal explanations of behavior may wear the mask of a proximate 
explanatory addition to an ultimate account of behavior because they fill the 
temporal gap between environmental events inducing behavior and the occurrence 
of the action itself, but that does not make such explanatory fictions valuable parts 
of scientific theories. Apart from the conceived problem of action at a distance 
within behavioral explanations, what else can lead to mentalistic explanations? 
Why Are Mentalistic Meme Interpretations Rampant? 
Metaphorical speech. As others have noted (e.g., Jahoda, 2002), memetic 
pseudo-explanations seem to result partly from the confusion of literal and 
metaphorical speech. Even when memes are explicitly defined as abstractions or 
neuronal patterns, it seems tempting to regard them as autonomous agents when 
writing about them with terms that are intended to be metaphorical. Blackmore’s 
(1999) meme theory, for instance, seems to build on an entanglement of 
metaphorical and literal speech. On the one hand, she writes: “I shall find myself 
saying that memes. . .‘try to do’ something. But we must remember that this is only 
short-hand for saying that the ‘something’ will improve the chances of the meme’s 
being copied” (pp. 162-163). On the other hand, she literally means that “memes 
make us work for their propagation” (personal communication, April 17, 2011). 
She maintains that her use of metaphors is only supposed to be a convenient 
shortcut, but it appears to be more like a blind alley. This happens when 
metaphorically meant sentences cannot be translated back into literal expressions. 
As Bennett and Hacker (2007) point out regarding brain parts, it is not enough to 
assert that one uses a notion in a new, metaphorical sense. When doing so, one 
must not assign all implications of the literal meaning to the metaphorical use. If 
one means a meme is metaphorically selfish, one cannot argue as if it were literally 
selfish. Not the explicit definition, but the use of terms tips the scales. For example, 
what would be the literal translation of the following two statements if one aimed 
at omitting the figurative elements that refer to memes as agents on their own? 
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1) A meme “encourages its host to keep on mentally rehearsing it” 
(Blackmore, 1997, p. 46); and 
2) “. . .attention is dragged away by sounds, movements, and most of all 
thoughts that seem to come from nowhere. These are the memes fighting it 
out to grab the information processing resources of the brain they might 
use for their propagation. You never did control the attention; it 
controlled—and created—you.” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 243) 
 
It is clear what it means for Lisa to encourage Ted, but what does it mean for 
something inside Lisa, a meme, to encourage her? An individual can be said to 
encourage another, but it is unclear what the term means in reference to parts of an 
individual, even if the parts exist. The problem is that, despite all attempts at 
clarification, it remains unclear what is meant metaphorically and what is meant 
literally.  
Category mistakes. Mentalistic explanations such as calling a belief or a 
meme the cause of an action can result from committing category mistakes. A 
category error is committed if the category label is confused with one of its 
instances (Ryle, 1949). Mentalistic explanations mistakenly identify a whole, for 
instance “having a God meme,” as the (efficient) cause of one of its parts, such as 
going to church. 
The custom of saying that someone has a belief, intelligence, personality, or a 
meme is partly responsible for confusion about different implications of the word 
exist, because if someone has something, a possible inference is that the something 
exists as an object. Memes, free will, attention, personality, intelligence, beliefs, 
and the like exist as words, as abstractions used to summarize certain incidents. 
They fulfill a shortcut function in scientific descriptions as well as in a variety of 
folk psychological accounts. For instance, since talk about Ted’s personality 
characteristics or intelligence is occasioned by his past actions, it indicates the 
likelihood for him to exhibit certain behavior in the future. Similarly, to speak of 
free will can also be seen as a language convention that is a shortcut for “no 
determinants of behavior are recognizable.” The narrow difference that determines 
whether the use of mental terms is justifiable is whether they are used as 
translatable shortcuts aiding the actual point or if they are offered as supposedly 
real causes which, however, lack empirical content. Hearing about someone’s 
beliefs (a shortcut, translatable into a behavior pattern) can influence our behavior. 
The term meme, on the contrary, cannot fulfill that function because few laypeople 
call “because I possess meme A” a satisfying answer or could react in accordance 
to it. This difference appears to be decreasing steadily as the term meme becomes 
more common among laypeople, especially in the context of events on the internet.  
It seems, however, that the meaning of the increasingly popular term 
(internet) meme in everyday discourse differs from the definitions disputed in 
academia. Internet memes are usually concrete; they are mostly links, pictures, 
audio, or video files. 
SIMON & BAUM 
136 
Memes as Neuronal Patterns 
Some authors (e.g., Dawkins, 1982b) who define memes abstractly as 
information maintain that memes have a physical realization in the brain. Others, 
such as Aunger (2002), identify memes with neuronal activity: “Most definitions of 
memes are abstract, couched in terms of information or the mental representation 
that results from imitation. But replicators exist as specific substrates, as physical 
complexes. So too must memes be if they are replicators” (p. 193). In Aunger’s 
line of reasoning, “[memes] are not only ‘carried’ or realized in physical 
substrates—they are these specific substrates” (Kronfeldner, 2005, p. 114). Not all 
authors, however, pursue such a clear ontological separation. Delius (1989), for 
example, states on the one hand that “memes are material structures (arrays of 
modified synapses)” (p. 54). In contrast, he mentions in the same essay that 
“memes still are largely abstract inferential entities, though we know that they are 
information coded in neural structures” (p. 47).  
Proponents like Delius (1989) define memes as constellations of activated and 
non-activated synapses in an individual’s brain—or, in other words, memes 
constitute “the material configurations in neural memory that code behavioral 
cultural traits” (p. 46). Moreover, Delius concludes that “any cultural trait taken 
over by a given individual from another individual must accordingly be thought of 
as the transfer of a particular pattern of activated/inactivated synapses from the 
associative networks of one brain to another brain” (p. 46). What does it mean to 
transfer a particular pattern of activated synapses from one brain to another?  
Delius (1989) acknowledges that “obviously (there) is not a bodily replication 
of the structures but there is nonetheless a multiple transfer of equivalent 
structures” (p. 45). In other words, a particular pattern is replicated but the 
replication does not match the original in all aspects. After replication, we have 
two patterns in two brains. If they are not alike in all aspects, some criteria must 
exist upon which we decide to call one pattern a replication of the other. In order to 
say that two people have one—or the same—meme, their neurological activity 
would either have to display structural or functional similarities (or both).  
According to many authors (e.g., Dawkins, 1982b; Dennett, 1996a) the 
commonalities are not (primarily) structural ones. For example, Delius (1989) 
writes that 
. . .naturally the hotspot pattern that a trait has in one brain will not be 
geometrically arranged in exactly the same way as the pattern that the same trait 
has in another brain. For that, the brains of different individuals are likely to be 
too different. (pp. 44-45) 
Likewise, Dennett (1996a) points out “. . .that it is very unlikely—but not 
quite impossible—that there is a uniform ‘brain language’ in which information is 
stored in different human brains, and this makes brains very different from 
chromosomes” (p. 353). This leads him to regard “the meme [as] primarily a 
semantic classification, not a syntactic classification that might be directly 
observed in ‘brain language’ or natural language” (pp. 353-354). He writes that it 
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would be flabbergasting to find that the brain-cell complex that stores an idea in 
one person is the same as or very similar to the brain-cell complex that stores the 
idea in everyone who has that idea. Due to the lack of observable structural 
similarities, Dennett dismisses the definition of memes as neurological patterns 
and instead defines memes abstractly as information. 
No structural similarities of neuronal activity patterns that qualify for defining 
an equivalence class have yet been named. To confirm that “nonetheless a multiple 
transfer of equivalent structures” (Delius, 1989, p. 45) occurs, one would have to 
observe functional resemblance of dissimilar-looking synapse patterns in order to 
give evidence for meme transmission. Here, the question arises of how we decide 
on the functional equivalence of two neuronal patterns. Naturally, we observe how 
two people behave, and if their actions are similar enough we call their 
neurological activity functionally equivalent. 
However, if the behavioral pattern is first seen in one person, then in the other, 
how can we claim that a neurological pattern has replicated from one person to the 
other, if all we can observe to be similar is behavior in these two people? What 
value accrues from explaining the similar behavior patterns by reference to 
dissimilar neurological activity? Only the people’s actions can be said to be 
equivalent. Consequently, as long as no structural similarities are observed we 
have no reason to argue that the unit of replication is a synaptic hotspot pattern. 
Practices: The Units of Selection in Cultural Evolution 
The goal of this paper is not to define what memes really are; rather, it is to 
detail what approach to them can prove useful. As became apparent in the first two 
sections, defining the meme as a neurological pattern or a vague, abstract entity 
faces serious problems. This section presents an alternative approach based on a 
definition of units of cultural transmission that makes them directly available to 
scientific study. 
Endeavors to Read Memes as Behavior 
When Dawkins (1976) coined the term, he originally defined a meme as “a 
new kind of replicator” (p. 206), “a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of 
imitation” (p. 206). Dawkins (1982a) defined a replicator “as any entity in the 
universe of which copies are made” (p. 46). The central question of memetics 
became what to regard as “a unit of cultural transmission” (Dawkins, 1976, p. 206). 
This initial broad definition holds, among other things, the possibility to either 
define memes as hidden entities that are selected and make people behave in 
certain ways or to regard the units of selection as concrete, directly transmitted 
cultural practices.  
The latter possibility, however, was excluded when Dawkins (1982b) aimed to 
be more specific and changed his original definition. He redefined a meme as “a 
unit of information residing in a brain [that] has a definite structure, realized in 
whatever physical medium the brain uses for storing information” (p. 109). He 
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“regard[s] it as physically residing in the brain” (p. 109). Further, he explains that 
“the phenotypic effects of a meme may be in the form of words, music, visual 
images, styles of clothes, facial or hand gestures” (p. 109). 
In addition, Dawkins (1982b) explicitly distinguished between the replicator 
(which is said to be information), its vehicle (being neuronal activity), and its 
phenotypic effects (which can be observed as the examples given above). He 
differentiates between the meme, which is a kind of essence or basic idea, and its 
manifestations. Thus, he argues that something essential, a meme, must be present 
whenever instances of a certain class of behaviors occur. The abstract core idea of 
a scientific theory, for example, is replicated and thereby identical in every 
individual who understands the theory. Since several individuals usually do not 
have exactly the same understanding of a theory, there are different meme 
interpretations. As an example, Dawkins uses Darwinism:  
The meme of Darwin’s theory is therefore that essential basis of the idea, which 
is held in common by all brains that understand the theory. The differences in 
the ways that people represent the theory are then, by definition, not part of the 
meme. (pp. 195-196) 
Dawkins’s broad first definition also classified unobservable mental entities 
as memes. His 1982 definition, however, turns the unobservable mental entities 
into the main objects of study (cf. Gatherer, 1998). The later definition puts more 
emphasis on the gene–meme analogy by distinguishing between an entity subject 
to selection and another one that we observe: activities of individuals caused by 
that entity. Natural selection cannot directly affect private events such as thoughts 
or feelings and even less abstractions such as beliefs or memes. Only behavior that 
affects the environment can be selected by consequences; by definition, that is 
public behavior. Selection can favor advantageous behavioral tendencies and 
patterns, as long as they are influenced to some extent by genes (Baum, 2011). 
Culture may be considered to consist of behavior. Cultural practices may be 
regarded as its units. These are transmitted directly. Approaches to define memes 
in observable, concrete terms have, for example, been put forward by Benzon 
(1996) and Gatherer (1998). Benzon proposes “that we think of. . .mental objects 
and processes as being analogous to the biologist’s phenotype just as the physical 
objects and processes are analogous to the genotype” (p. 24). He defines the whole 
of physical culture (such as pots, statues, dances, songs, and knives) as memes 
because they are what people exchange and the means by which they interact. 
Benzon also asks “What then of the ideas, desires, emotions, and attitudes behind 
these things?” (p. 24) and finds the answer in equating them to the biological 
phenotype. He considers these events to result from “physical culture.” His 
division resembles Dawkins’s, except that Benzon (1996) places memotypes in the 
environment and defines phemotypes as abstractions encoded in neuronal activities, 
whereas Dawkins does the opposite.1 Benzon’s motivation to define memes as 
                                                          
1 Note that the terms memotype and phemotype are supposed to be analogies to genotype 
and phenotype in genetics. No general agreement exists on their definitions. Grant (1990), 
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observables is that he wants them to be “counted and classified and variously 
studied” (p. 24). He overlooks, however, that in the framework of his suggestion 
phemotypes have as little potential to become subject to observation as Dawkins’s 
memes (in the 1982 definition). 
An Outline of Cultural Evolution in Concrete Terms 
Given that evolution takes place in culture as it does in biology, an 
evolutionary process needs to be defined of which genetic and cultural evolution 
are examples. Such a process can be composed of variation within a pool of 
replicators, transmission by copying, and selection due to differential copying 
(Baum, 2000). In the following paragraphs these components are defined for 
cultural evolution.  
The replicators. We regard units of cultural transmission as concrete and 
observable behavioral units. The replicators are practices consisting of units of 
operant behavior (i.e., behavior under control of consequences and context). 
Practices are shared by members of a group and acquired as a result of group 
membership. Calling behavioral units practices helps to distinguish them from an 
individual’s idiosyncratic behavioral patterns that are not passed along or 
replicated within a culture. Like any operant unit, a cultural practice consists of a 
context, the effective behavior, and its consequences. Since no context, action, or 
consequence can occur twice in exactly the same manner, they are defined as 
populations. To be precise, a unit of operant behavior consists of (a) a population 
of functionally equivalent events that constitute the context or discriminative 
stimulus, (b) the population of behavioral variants that accomplish the particular 
environmental effect, and (c) a population of outcomes produced by the behavior 
in that context (Skinner, 1981). Hence, a practice is defined by its function, by “the 
job it gets done” (Baum, 2000; Guerin, 1997). 
An example of a culturally transmitted practice is the washing of produce 
before consumption. When Lisa was a child, her father taught her to wash fruits 
and vegetables before eating them by providing a context (e.g., by handing an 
apple to her and uttering “Please wash it before eating”). Her father could have 
provided the discriminative stimulus in a variety of ways. For example, he might 
have pointed to the sink or formulated his request in different ways. All instances 
that led to Lisa’s washing of the apple belong to the population of events called 
context. The effective behavior—her washing of the apple—can also be exhibited 
in a variety of ways that achieve the same result, that is, a clean apple. She could, 
for example, move her hands in one way or another, or wash it in the kitchen or the 
bathroom. All behavioral instances leading to a clean apple count into the 
population of effective behavior, no matter what exact physical motions might take 
place. The population of outcomes produced by Lisa’s apple-washing after having 
                                                                                                                                                   
for example, defines the memotype as the actual information content of a meme and 
distinguishes it from its realization, its phemotype. 
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been told to do so might include her father’s approval by saying, “Well done!,” his 
smiling at her, or cutting the apple into pieces and handing them to her.  
Frequently, the context of a practice is a rule (“Wash fruits before 
consumption!”), and reinforcement is socially mediated (e.g., by approval). 
Eventually, long-term contingencies may take over when the context becomes a 
non-social discriminative stimulus (such as an apple), and the reinforcers are 
environmentally based as well as more directly related to reproductive success. 
Some psychologists might claim that Lisa has “internalized” the rule once she 
washes her apples even when no one tells her to or praises her afterwards. Control 
remains in the environment; however, it has been transferred from an obvious 
proximate contingency to an ultimate, more extended contingency (Baum, 2000, 
2005). 
Dawkins developed the concept of meme based on the conviction that 
Darwinism is too big a theory to be tied to genes alone (Dawkins & Miele, 1995). 
He aimed at providing an example of another replicator, one more instance of 
varied information that is transmitted selectively. To what extent do the replicators 
of cultural evolution, defined in behavioral terms, resemble genes? 
Looking at possible analogies to genetic evolution might prove useful for 
deriving hypotheses on how Darwinism is applicable to culture. For example, the 
pool of replicators, consisting of practices that occur in a group, can be considered 
analogous to a gene pool. Various ways to behave that achieve a common result are 
comparable to diverse alleles. For instance, different manners of dressing resulting 
in attracting a partner can be seen as competing practices comparable to alleles 
coding for different colors in flowers (Baum, 2000).  
Furthermore, practices, like genes, are interdependent and might therefore be 
compared to the genome. As Dawkins (1982b) points out, selection may operate on 
clusters of genes or even on the entire genome. All the practices that occur in an 
individual’s repertoire in a period long enough to be sampled but short enough to 
be considered stable could be thought of as corresponding to the genome in genetic 
evolution (Baum, 2000). 
Even if Dawkins’ gene–meme analogy is far from being the central point of 
his theory, his proposal of a second replicator was originally built upon and derived 
from what is known about genes. As becomes obvious in the scope of this paper, 
numerous different comparisons to phenotype and genotype have been put forward 
(e.g., Blackmore, 1999; Dawkins, 1982b; Delius, 1989). Many of the proposed 
analogies do not hold up in all aspects. The flaws of the comparison, however, do 
little harm to the overall idea of evolutionary mechanisms acting on the spread of 
practices; cultural replicators need not resemble genetic ones in all or even many 
aspects. The analogy might guide us; suggestions of what to search for can be 
derived from it. A failure of the analogy, however, has few implications for the 
value of a theory of cultural evolution. 
Selection. Transmission of cultural practices occurs selectively because some 
function better than others in achieving a certain goal. Of several rival practices 
fulfilling the same function, those that correlate most closely with positive 
consequences increase in frequency. Thus, competing practices are selected by 
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their differential consequences. Those consequential events have gained their 
power to reinforce or punish from phylogeny (Baum, 2012; see also this paper’s 
section on imitation). They are effective in a short-term context because they are 
connected to survival and reproductive success in the long run. Due to their 
differential consequences, some behavioral patterns survive and become common 
practice in a cultural group whereas others disappear. Letting people know about 
events via Facebook has gradually become more popular than calling each other on 
telephones or mailing letters. The Facebook practice saves resources and time.  
As mentioned above, single practices (e.g., taking photos on vacations), as 
well as practice-complexes (a term chosen analogously to the concept of 
memeplexes argued for by, for example, Blackmore (1999)), are selected by 
consequences. An example of such a complex of practices that might be selected 
for is the Tibetan tradition of fraternal polyandry (i.e., one woman marrying 
several husbands who are brothers). This lifestyle usually involves all brothers 
raising each other’s children and giving none preferential treatment. Biological 
fatherhood often remains unclear. This practice occurs in rural areas where families 
(mostly belonging to the tre-ba class) own small plots of mountainous land that 
can support the family but are useless when split into small pieces. Moreover, a 
plot requires the physical strength of several men to be farmed. The practices of 
polyandry, conjoint farming, and conjoint child rearing independent of biological 
fatherhood, as well as living on small pieces of land in rural mountainous areas, 
were selected together. Keeping in mind that brothers genetically resemble each 
other, this combination of practices can be considered to be a way to maximize 
genetic fitness given the challenging circumstances.  
Mechanism(s) of transmission. Contrary to most meme proponents (e.g., 
Blackmore and Dawkins), we suggest two possible mechanisms by which cultural 
practices can be transmitted. Meme is a shortening of mimeme, which originates 
from Ancient Greek μίμημα, meaning something imitated (Pickett, 2006). In the 
dispute about the appropriate definition of the term, Blackmore (2003) chooses to 
stick with Dawkins’s (1976) original etymologically-based definition of memes 
being literally that which is imitated or that which is copied. Thus, Blackmore 
(1999) emphasizes strongly that memes can, by definition, only be transmitted 
through imitation. We propose that cultural practices (no matter what we call them) 
are not merely transmitted by imitation, but also by instruction (cf. Baum, 2000). 
 Imitation. Imitation occurs when a model provided by one group member 
induces similar behavior in another person. Imitation itself does not transmit 
behavior. The induced behavior persists only if it is what is traditionally called 
“reinforced,” that is, if it leads to consequences that will induce it in the future 
(Baum, 2000, 2012). Those consequences are either themselves phylogenetically 
important events (Baum, 2012) such as food, shelter, or mating opportunities, or 
they are connected to such an event. If imitated behavior correlates with 
phylogenetically disadvantageous events such as exposure to parasites, severe 
weather, or predators, or if there is no relation to consequences, the imitated 
actions will not persist. In imitation learning, consequences are not socially 
mediated and occur apart from the model’s actions.  
SIMON & BAUM 
142 
For example, when Ted approaches a bus stop where his bus is already 
standing, he might notice how someone, who is heading toward the bus, starts 
running. This induces Ted to run, too. If he catches the bus, his running is 
reinforced because it correlates with getting to his appointment on time and 
avoiding the punishment of being late, independent of the runner model with 
whom he has no interaction. Those positive consequences will induce his running 
next time he sees the bus at approximately the same distance standing at the bus 
stop. After having run for a bus at a certain distance several times without ever 
catching it, Ted would eventually stop running because his sprinting will correlate 
with being physically exhausted and sweaty without receiving the benefits of being 
on time. Eventually, his running will start to discriminate between a bus close 
enough to catch and one too far away to catch. 
Instruction. In contrast to transmission of cultural practices through imitation, 
when behavior is passed on through instruction, an instructor providing a positive 
consequence is involved. The apple washing example above illustrates how a 
cultural practice can be passed on by instruction. The father, the instructor, sets the 
context (e.g., by handing Lisa an apple and turning on the faucet) and supplies 
relatively immediate reinforcement (e.g., by petting Lisa’s head and uttering 
“Good job!”). Eventually there will be long-term benefits that are more directly 
related to reproductive success, such as Lisa’s maintenance of good health due to 
avoidance of fertilizer consumption. Over time, the father’s instructing correlates 
with its positive consequences, namely Lisa’s appropriate behavior. If Lisa never 
complied, he would eventually stop manipulating (i.e., instructing) her behavior. In 
human culture, instruction, being tightly interwoven with practices of rule-giving, 
can be considered the more important one of the two mechanisms involved in the 
transmission of cultural practices.  
Conclusions 
Dawkins introduced the concept of meme to point out “that Darwinism 
doesn’t have to be tied to genes” (Dawkins & Miele, 1995, p. 85). Most scholars 
would agree that variation, transmission, and selection do not occur only in 
biological evolution. Aiming to offer a naturalistic explanation of cultural 
phenomena (i.e., an account based on natural laws and forces, as opposed to 
supernatural ones), memetics emphasizes an important point by shifting the focus 
away from individuals who decide to behave one way or another to regarding our 
activities as resulting from the mechanisms of natural selection, comparable to our 
physical properties. Mistaken, however, is the way the analogy to the genotype–
phenotype distinction is formulated, which implies a mentalistic approach to 
behavior and its causes, highly reminiscent of Cartesian dualism. The existence of 
an unobservable entity that is supposed to be selected by its phenotypic behavioral 
effects is merely inferred from observing people’s activities. Selection acts directly 
upon behavioral patterns. The concepts of behavioral selection (learning) by 
consequences and context eliminate the need to consider hidden causes to explain 
the spread of cultural practices such as singing songs, building arches, and wearing 
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stiletto heels (which are examples of memes [or “phemotypes”] given by Dawkins 
(1976)). The answer to the question of why some practices increase in frequency 
while others disappear is to be found in their differential effects on the 
environment. Claims about arbitrary, hidden causes are superfluous and hamper 
scientific inquiry. 
Many questions are still to be answered regarding the evolution and spread of 
cultural practices, but the concept of meme is unlikely to be helpful in arriving at 
answers. Calling the units of cultural transmission, consisting of practices, memes 
carries the danger of their being confused with definitions as neurological patterns 
or definitions in vague, abstract terms. A theory of cultural evolution excluding 
inscrutably operating terms is needed to understand the spread of cultural practices. 
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